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Abstract 
We investigate the effect of employer job security guarantees on employee perceptions of job 
security. Using linked employer-employee data from the 1998 British Workplace Employee 
Relations Survey, we find job security guarantees reduce employee perceptions of job 
insecurity.  This finding is robust to endogenous selection of job security guarantees by 
employers engaging in organisational change and workforce reductions.  Furthermore, there 
is no evidence that increased job security through job guarantees results in greater work 
intensification, stress, or lower job satisfaction. 
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Economists have long argued that worker perceptions of job insecurity are important since 
they determine a range of economic outcomes, including wages (Aarnoson and Sullivan, 
1998), consumption - most notably with respect to home ownership (Doling and Ford, 1996), 
and savings (Manski, 2004).  Other social scientists stress the effect of job insecurity on 
employee welfare indicators such as employees’ psychological well-being and effects on 
family relationships (Burchell, 1994; 1999).  Job security is also highly valued by employees.  
For example, in 1998, at a time when unemployment was relatively low in the United States, 
the General Social Survey indicates that job security was the job attribute most likely to be 
viewed as ‘very important’.  Fifty-seven percent rated it ‘very important’.  This compares, for 
example, with 51 percent for ‘interesting work’, 37 percent for ‘chances of advancement’, 31 
percent for ‘useful to society’ and 23 percent for ‘high income in a job’ 
(http//:www.icpsr.umich.edu:8080/GSS/homepage.htm). There has been considerable debate 
as to whether there is a secular upward trend in job insecurity in Britain.  Results depend 
heavily on the type of insecurity measure used and the group of workers being studied (Green 
et al., 2000). The growing consensus is that perceptions of job insecurity rose during the 
1970s and 1980s for most types of worker (Burchell et al., 1997), and perhaps into the mid-
1990s (Bryson and McKay, 1997) but have levelled off or even declined since then, reflecting 
an improvement in economic conditions and attendant optimism regarding re-employment 
probabilities (Green, 2003; Burchell et al., 1999).1  Nevertheless, worker perceptions of job 
insecurity remain high by international standards.  Using internationally comparable data for 
1997, Green (2003) shows almost 30 per cent of British workers regarded their jobs to be 
insecure – twice as high as the rate in the United States and considerably higher than in other 
countries.2  This perception corroborates employer perceptions that employment security is 
low in the UK relative to other countries, something that seems to reflect differences in legal 
employment protections, union density and the prevelance of atypical employment (Morgan, 
Genre and Wilson, 2001). 
The literature on the correlates and determinants of perceived job insecurity has 
focused on individuals’ characteristics, business cycle effects and job attributes (eg. Green et 
al., 2000, 2003; Bryson and McKay, 1997), notably job tenure and non-standard contracts 
(eg. Gallie et al., 1998).  Data limitations mean less is known about the impact of employer 
practices on employee job insecurity.  Yet employers may gain substantially from employee 
                                                 
1 A similar pattern has been observed for the United States (Green, 2003). 
2 These data are based on agree/disagree scales in response to the statement ‘My job is secure’ and are taken 
from the International Social Survey Programme Data. 
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job security, since it may increase labour productivity through encouragement of worker 
investment in firm-specific human capital and increased worker motivation through 
affiliation to the organisation.  This article exploits rich linked employer-employee data to 
establish the effectiveness of employer policies that are explicitly aimed at reducing 
employee perceptions of job insecurity, namely job security guarantees.  To our knowledge, 
no one has investigated whether these policies reduce employee perceptions of job insecurity. 
Such an investigation is merited, not only because job security is highly valued by 
employees, but because these guarantees are widespread in Britain and are used by employers 
to elicit employee trust and cooperation in times of change. The second section considers the 
incidence of job security guarantees in Britain, the circumstances in which employers 
introduce them, and hypothetical links between job security policies and employee 
perceptions of job security.  The third section introduces the data.  The fourth section presents 
descriptive analyses.  Section five presents analysis of the causal impact of job security 
guarantees on perceptions of job insecurity and section six concludes. 
 
 
Reasons for introducing job security guarantees and their potential impact 
on employee perceptions of job insecurity 
 
In parts of continental Europe, job security is often mandated under statute.  In Britain, as in 
the United States, job security guarantees usually emanate from enterprise or establishment-
level bargaining between employers and employees or their representatives.  This paper 
considers the role of job security guarantees in the absence of a statutory mandate.  Under 
these conditions, empirical evidence for Britain suggests there are two common scenarios in 
which employers are likely to derive benefit from a policy offering job security (IRS, 1997).  
The first is when employers are embarking on a programme of organisational change.  These 
programmes often signal employer efforts to elicit increased employee commitment and 
involvement through a shift from traditional working practices towards team working and 
multiskilling, with a view to increasing labour productivity (Geary, 2003: 354-355).  Such 
changes can create job insecurity since workers are being asked to share their firm-specific 
human capital with others, a process of knowledge-sharing which makes each worker more 
dispensible.  In addition, multiskilling and delayering, by increasing labour productivity, may 
reduce the number of jobs required to produce and deliver the product or service.  This is why 
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the social partnership literature in the UK (which is akin to the mutual gains literature in the 
US) makes a link between job security guarantees and concessions by employees in the 
flexible deployment of labour (Kelly, 2004). The logic behind this package is a trade-off 
between management and labour whereby the firm can obtain a competitive advantage 
through flexible labour practices, in return for which employees obtain some form of 
guarantee that their increased productivity will not lead to enforced job cuts.3 If successful, 
this may enhance perceptions of job security, but it is not clear what the implications might 
be for other aspects of the job, such as work intensity, pay satisfaction and intrinsic job 
satisfaction.4 
The second scenario in which employers may benefit from policies offering job 
security is prior to downsizing.  Irrespective of whether management is looking to introduce 
new employment practices, there will be times when workplaces seek workforce reductions, 
for example, to improve competitiveness, in response to a downturn in product demand, or as 
part of the internal structural reorganisation within a larger organisation.  In such 
circumstances, the employer will want to lose some posts but retain others. Job security 
policies often guarantee no compulsory redundancies.  Where such an offer is made to the 
whole workforce, the employer will seek workforce reductions through natural wastage, 
redeployment within the organisation, or a voluntary redundancy programme.  The employer 
may stop short of guaranteeing no compulsory redundancies but make a commitment to 
exploring alternative methods of achieving workforce reductions before compulsory 
redundancies are considered. In other circumstances, compulsory redundancy may be 
unavoidable, but the employer will nevertheless offer a job security guarantee to those she 
wishes to retain (IRS, 1997). 
Despite the potential value of job security policies to employers and employees, no-
one has yet established whether they work in terms of reducing employees’ perceptions of job 
insecurity.  Descriptive evidence based on the survey used in this paper indicates that in 
Britain in the late 1990s “workforce reductions were equally common among workplaces 
with and without a job security policy” (Cully et al., 1999: 80).  In fact, extending the 
analysis to all workplaces in the survey, those with a job security guarantee were more likely 
than those without to have experienced workforce reductions in the preceeding 12 months: 35 
                                                 
3 Because of the link between security guarantees and job flexibility, some employers prefer the phrase 
“employment security” to “job security” (IRS, 1997). 
4 Forth and Millward (2004), using the same data set as that used in this paper, identify a wage premium 
attached to workplaces using high-involvement management practices, but only in the presence of job security 
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percent had reduced their workforce size, compared with 26 percent among those without a 
job security guarantee.5 This survey evidence is consistent with case study evidence that job 
security guarantees do not reduce the likelihood of workforce reductions.  For example, of the 
22 social partnership case studies identified by Kelly (2004: 274) in the period 1991-2000, 11 
had employment security clauses.  Of these, 8 had suffered job losses since partnership 
began, compared with only 4 of the 11 who did not have employment security clauses.  Kelly 
(2004: 281) argues his finding “suggests that the main function of “job security” agreements 
is to help companies jointly manage labor force reductions rather than avoid them”.  This 
leaves open the question of how employees feel about their job security when workforce 
reductions are ‘being managed’, as opposed to circumstances when they are not ‘being 
managed’.  It is possible that perceptions of job insecurity may be lower where there is a job 
security guarantee because, where such a policy is in place, employers are much less likely to 
obtain workforce reductions through compulsory redundancies (Cully et al., 1999: 80).  Our 
analysis for the whole sample confirms that compulsory redundancies are less likely where a 
job security guarantee is present: 31 percent of those making workforce reductions in the 
previous 12 months in the absence of a job security guarantee had used compulsory 
redundancies, compared with 12 percent among those with a job security guarantee.  These 
findings suggest that, where workforce reductions are sought, job security guarantees may 
reduce the probability of a forced exit from the organisation.  It is this prospect of avoiding 
compulsory redundancies, rather than workforce reductions per se, that may make job 
security guarantees attractive to employees. 
Even if job security guarantees seem to be associated with increased job security, the 
effect may not be causal.  For instance, workers may sort themselves into workplaces 
according to the employer practices in place.  If risk-averse workers value job security 
guarantees more than other workers they may be more likely to be employed in workplaces 
offering security guarantees.  If this sorting occurs it may suggest job security guarantees are 
successful when, in fact, the effect is driven by sorting across workers. A positive association 
between job security guarantees and employee job security may also occur through 
workplace sorting.  For instance, this might occur because employers favouring long-term 
relationships with their employees to reap the rewards of training investments, are more 
                                                                                                                                                        
guarantees.  They suggest that job security guarantees help ensure high-involvement management elicits 
productivity improvements from which workers can benefit.  
5 Cully et al. (1999) confine their analysis to workplaces with 25 or more employees, whereas the figures 
presented here relate to all workplaces in the sample, including those with between 10 and 24 employees. 
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inclined to grant employees’ request for a job security guarantee than employers who are less 
concerned about fostering a long-term relationship with employees. In section four we 
discuss how we tackle this problem of endogeneity. 
There are also a number of reasons why one might anticipate a negative association 
between perceived job security and job security guarantees. First, there may be reverse 
causation: employers may introduce job security guarantees where concerns about job 
security are high.  Of course, in this case, it is the underlying causes of this insecurity, rather 
than the policy per se, which generates the insecurity. Second, we might expect the practice 
to affect employees differently according to whether they are covered.  If the security of one 
group of workers is achieved at the expense of other employees not covered by the guarantee, 
the latter may feel particularly insecure since they know they have been singled out as 
occupying jobs likely to go in any workforce reductions.  Third, it may be that the policy 
does not offer the degree of job security that employees are looking for, creating an 
‘expectation gap’ which results in employees expressing greater job insecurity than they 
might otherwise do.  This could be particularly apparent where the job security guarantee is 
the result of collective bargaining, as is often the case.  This is because, as part of the 
bargaining process, unions may encourage ‘voice-induced complaining’ to strengthen their 
bargaining hand with the employer (Freeman and Medoff, 1984).6    
Given the circumstances in which employers introduce job security guarantees, it 
seems plausible that the employer may expect some kind of quid pro quo.  This may take the 
form of employer expectations of greater latitude in the deployment of labour (Kelly, 2004; 
IRS, 1997).  In such circumstances, the additional pressure on remaining workers may 
manifest itself in lower job satisfaction, greater work stress, or perceptions of work 
intensification.  Alternatively, the employer might view granting a job security guarantee as 
part of a gift exchange, with the employer getting the good will of employees in return 
(Akerlof, 1982).  We therefore explore these possibilities in our data.  
 
 
                                                 
6 Using the data we use in this paper, Guest and Conway (2003) find that unionisation is associated with greater 
perceptions of job insecurity controlling for other factors. 
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Data 
 
The data are the linked employer-employee British Workplace Employee Relations Survey 
1998 (WERS98).  With appropriate weighting they are nationally representative of British 
employees working in workplaces with 10 ore more employees.  The surveys had high 
response rates (80 percent in the workplace survey and 64 percent in the employee survey), 
giving us some confidence that the data are representative of the populations from which they 
were drawn.7  The linkage between employees and employers allows us to estimate the effect 
of employer characteristics, including job security guarantees, on employees in those 
workplaces, controlling also for employee characteristics. 
Job security guarantees: The workplace survey asks HR managers: ‘Is there a policy of 
guaranteed job security or no-compulsory redundancies for any …[groups of workers]..at this 
workplace?’  Eleven percent of workplaces have such a policy: in 7.9 percent of cases the 
policy covers managerial and non-managerial employees; in 2.7 percent of cases it covers 
non-managerial employees only; and in only 0.4 percent of cases is it confined to managerial 
employees. 
The measure of job insecurity.  Economists conceive of job insecurity in terms of the 
risk and the cost of job loss (eg. Nickell et al., 2002).  Our survey simply asks each employee 
‘Do you agree or disagree with the following statements about your job….. 
“I feel my job is secure in this workplace”. 
They are able to tick one of five boxes ranging from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly 
disagree’. We conjecture that workers’ responses to this statement are partly a function of 
their expectations of job loss and their expectations of good outcomes should job search 
become necessary.  However, their responses may also reflect the stability of their 
employment conditions more generally (Greenhalgh and Rosenblatt, 1984; Burchell et al., 
1997) and, as such, might offer a more complete picture of job insecurity.  There are 
drawbacks to this measure of job insecurity.  Responses may not be interpersonally 
comparable and may be only a rough proxy for worker expectations regarding exogenous job 
loss and the subjective distribution of outcomes should they search for new employment 
(Manski and Straub, 2000).  However, Green (2003) finds workers’ perceived risks of job 
loss and unemployment are predictive of subsequent experience, perhaps indicating that, 
                                                 
7 For full information on the survey’s design see Cully et al. (1999). 
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when giving subjective responses, employees are drawing on private information not 
otherwise observable to the researcher. 
Control variables. Multivariate regression analyses control for a range of individual 
and workplace characteristics to minimize estimation bias arising from omitted variables.  All 
these variables are described with their mean scores in Appendix Table 1.  
 
 
Descriptive analysis  
 
Table 1 indicates that 19 percent of employees ‘disagreed’ or ‘strongly disagreed’ with the 
statement ‘I feel my job is secure in this workplace’.8  The distribution of responses is 
virtually identical across those working in a workplace with a job security guarantee and 
those in workplaces without a security guarantee. 
 
Table 1:   
Employee responses to the statement ‘I feel my job is secure in this workplace’ 
 Job security guarantee: 
 Yes No All 
Strongly agree 12 13 13 
Agree 48 47 47 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
20 21 21 
Disagree 14 14 14 
Strongly disagree 6 5 5 
Unweighted base: 3060 15990 19050 
Note: Base is all employees working in workplaces with 10+ employees excluding those with missing data.  
Figures are column percentages based on data that are weighted back to the population of employees working in 
workplaces with 10+ employees.   
 
Employees’ perceptions of job insecurity are a function of their own characteristics, 
such as age and gender, their job characteristics, and workplace attributes.  Thus, to explore 
the relationship between job security guarantees and job insecurity further we estimate a set 
                                                 
8 GSS data for the US in 1998 indicates that 13 percent of employees either ‘disagreed’ or ‘disagreed strongly’ 
with the statement ‘My job is secure’ (http://www.icpsr.umich.edu:8080/GSS/homepage.htm, variable 
RSECJOB), confirming Green’s (2003) conjecture that perceived job insecurity may be higher in the UK. 
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of specifications where job insecurity is regressed on personal, job and workplace 
characteristics, and a job security guarantee dummy.  This allows us to identify the 
independent effect of job security guarantees, net of observable characteristics of employees 
and their working environment.  However, other features of the workplace and employee 
which are unobervable to us, such as employees’ risk preferences, may be correlated with the 
presence of a job security guarantee and affect perceived job security.  Consequently, owing 
to the endogeneity issues discussed earlier, it is important at this stage not to infer any causal 
interpretation from the estimated coefficients. 
We assume that the job insecurity propensity of individual i (i=1,…,N) is summarised 
by a continuous latent variable Si* which is a linear function of personal, job and workplace 
attributes represented by the column vector Xi, a dummy variable Gi taking value 1 if the 
individual is in a workplace with a job security guarantee and 0 otherwise and an error term εi 
distributed as standard normal: 
 
Si*=Xi’β+δGi+εi (1)
 
where β is a vector of coefficients associated with personal attributes and δ is the scalar 
coefficient associated with the guarantee. The set of controls included in Xi refers to personal 
background, occupational and job characteristics including gross weekly earnings and 
average weekly hours worked, and workplace controls. S*i is not observed; rather, in the 
WERS questionnaire we observe Si, its discrete realisation which can assume a set of ordered 
values depending on S*i crossing the latent cut-off points τ1..τ4. Coefficients in (1) can be 
estimated using an ordered probit model. We adjust the estimator to account for differential 
sampling probability across establishments by applying sampling weights and account for the 
presence of multiple observations within the same establishment using a robust variance 
estimator.  
Results are reported in Table 2. We first include only Gi among regressors and then 
progressively add personal, job and workplace characteristics. By doing so, we can control 
how the estimated job security guarantee coefficient varies as the set of controls widens: 
changes in the guarantee coefficient would signal that the policy is correlated with the 
observable attributes suggesting that membership is not random and might also be correlated 
with personal attributes not observed in the data, causing endogeneity. 
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Table 2:  
Regressing job security guarantees on employee perceptions of job insecurity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Guarantee 0.026  
(0.54) 
-0.047 
(0.98) 
-0.050 
(1.06) 
-0.129 
(2.78) 
Personal 
characteristics 
Job characteristics  
Workplace 
characteristics  
No 
 
No 
 
No 
Yes 
 
No 
 
No 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
No 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Model F-test 1,1465=0.29 15,1451=18.02 39,1427=20.20 65,1401=14.98 
Model p-value 0.5923 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: (1) Table shows job security guarantee coefficients from models estimating perceptions of job insecurity 
using ordered probit models.  (2) Regressions use survey stratification weights and account for repeated 
observatioins on the same establishment.  (3) A ‘yes’ indicates that the relevant set of control variables is 
included in the regression.  Personal characteristics: female, age (7 dummies), qualifications (3 dummies), 
health problems, non-white, has children, , married or living as married, union member.  Job characteristics: 
occupation (3 dummies), gender segregation of job within workplace, family-friendly practices index, able to 
take day off in emergency, paid overtime, permanent contract, training, hours (continuous), gross weekly pay 
(12 dummies), job tenure (5 dummies).  Workplace: sector (12 dummies), local unemployment rate, region (5 
dummies), establishment size, single autonomous workplace, public sector, head office, establishment age, 
workforce composition (4 dummies), union density (continuous).  (4) Asymptotically robust t-ratios in 
parentheses.  (5) The model F-tests show the F statistic together with the numerator and demominator degrees of 
freedom.  The F-statistic tests the hypothesis that all coefficients excluding the constant are zero.  (6) Sample is 
all cases with non-missing data (N=19,050) 
 
As can be seen from the first column, in the absence of control variables, there is no 
statistically significant difference between perceptions of job insecurity among those in a 
workplace with a security guarantee and those in workplaces without such a guarantee.  In 
column (2) we include a set of controls for personal characteristics. The independent 
variables in the model are jointly significant and the controls switch the sign of the 
coefficient on the job security guarantee dummy so that it becomes negative.  However, it 
remains statistically insignificant.9  
Estimates in column (3) also control for occupational and job characteristics. Our rich 
data mean that we are able to include a number of variables in addition to the standard 
variables available in most data sets. Although these variables are jointly significant 
(f(24,1442)=18.83, p>f 0.0000) their introduction does little to affect the size of the job 
security guarantee coefficient.   
As suggested earlier, differences in job insecurity across workers with and without job 
security guarantees may simply reflect unobserved heterogeneity at the firm or workplace 
level if the employers adopting job security guarantees are a non-random subset of all 
workplaces. Column (4) exploits the employer dimension of WERS and adds a set of controls 
for workplace characteristics. The workplace-level controls are jointly significant 
                                                 
9 The full models are not presented but are available on request from the authors. 
 10
(f(26,1440)=8.18, p>f=0.0000).  When added to the other controls, their effect is to double 
the size of the job guarantee coefficient and increase the precision with which it is estimated 
such that it becomes statistically significant at the 99% level. 
These results indicate that job security policies are negatively associated with perceived 
insecurity, and that this association only emerges after workplace characteristics have been 
controlled for.  This implies that job guarantees are adopted predominantly in workplaces 
characterised by higher ex ante job insecurity – perhaps because the workplace is undergoing 
organisational change or workforce reductions - hiding the beneficical impact of the policy 
behind compositional effects.  This finding points to the importance of taking workplace 
heterogeneity into account when evaluating the impact of job security guarantee policies, and 
it seems that the set of workplace-level controls available in WERS is capable of capturing 
this heterogeneity.  In the next section we explore the heterogeneity issue further by focusing 
on individual unobserved heterogeneity. 
 
 
The effect of job security guarantees on perceived job insecurity 
 
The analysis above suggests that, having controlled for a rich set of covariates, employees in 
workplaces with job security guarantees exhibit lower job insecurity than workers like them 
in workplaces without job security guarantees.  However, for reasons discussed above, it is 
possible that this negative association is induced by unobserved factors which co-determine 
the employer’s decision to adopt a job security policy and reported job insecurity. In this 
section we provide a direct test of the job security guarantee exogeneity hypothesis. 
To do this, we estimate the effect of the job security guarantee on job insecurity while 
simultaneously modelling job security guarantee status. In this way we are able to control for 
the presence of unobserved correlation between the policy and job insecurity, thus 
eliminating the bias induced by unobserved heterogeneity and delivering the causal impact of 
the guarantee on job insecurity. We augment equation (1) with a probit equation for the 
probability of job security guarantee coverage: 
 
G*i=Zi’γ+Wi’θ+ui (2)
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where G*i is a continuous latent propensity underlying the dummy Gi, Zi is a vector of 
observables, γ is the vector of coefficients associated with those observables, Wi is a variable 
that has no effect on perceived job security after the job guarantee has been controlled for, θ  
is the coefficient for this variable, and ui is an error term distributed as standard normal. We 
model the link between ui and εi by allowing them to be distributed as bivariate normal with 
unrestricted correlation ρ≡corr(εi ui). By simultaneously estimating equations (1) and (2) we 
are able to separately identify the correlation between unobservables – the coefficient ρ – and 
thus to remove the bias induced by unobserved heterogeneity from the coefficient δ in (1).10  
The set of attributes in Zi is identical to those in Xi. The attributes relate to both 
worker and employer characteristics, in recognition of the fact that whether a worker is 
employed at a workplace with a job security guarantee is a function of both worker choice 
between workplaces with and without a job security guarantee, and the employer decision as 
to whether or not to adopt a job security guarantee.  The “instrument” in Wi is a dummy 
variable identifying workplaces where a high percentage of  the sales revenue (in the case of 
the trading sector) or operating costs (in the case of non-trading establishments) is accounted 
for by labour costs.11  The identifying assumption is that, since high labour costs are an 
indicator of employer reliance on labour as opposed to capital in the production process, 
employers with higher labour costs are more likely than other employers to want to retain 
their workers and are thus more likely to adopt job security guarantee policies.12  Of course, if 
employees were able to make this linkeage in their own minds, high labour costs would also 
partially determine their own job security perceptions.  However, we argue that this is highly 
unlikely since the proportion of revenue or costs accounted for by labour costs is a structural 
feature of the workplace that is not easily observable by the employee and, as such, does not 
enter her informatioin set.  Thus our identifying strategy takes advantage of the linked 
                                                 
10 See Heckman (1978) for a discussion of systems of probit equations with dummy endogenous variables. 
11 The precise question asked of HR managers is: “About what proportion of this establishment’s [sales 
revenue/operating costs] is accounted for by wages, salaries and other labour costs like pensions and national 
insurance?”  Answers are coded to one of four categories: ‘less than 25%’, ‘25% but less than 50%’, ‘50% but 
less than 75%’ and ‘75% or more’. 
12 A high labour cost ratio may be driven by the employment of high quality of labour, the employment of a 
large quantity of labour, or a combination of the two.  It is conceivable that, where labour cost ratios are high 
due to the large quantity of labour, and capital can easily substitute for labour, the employer may want to replace 
labour with capital equipment, thus lowering the propensity to adopt a job security guarantee.  In our 
specification we control for the number of employees in the establishment, such that our labour cost ratio 
proxies labour quality rather than quantity, which is why we emphasise the positive link between high labour 
cost ratios and job security guarantees.  This hypothesis is borne out by descriptive data, which shows that 
20.2% of workplaces with high labour cost ratios had job security guarantees, compared to 8.2% of workplaces 
with low labour cost ratios.  Either way, there is no reason to suspect that labour cost ratios will affect employee 
perceptions of job insecurity. 
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employer-employee data.  We hypothesise a positive link between high labour costs and job 
security guarantees and claim that this has no effect on individual job insecurity.  
The estimated coefficient on job security guarantees reveals that, after endogenisation 
of the membership status, the coefficient on the policy more than doubles (rising from -.129 
to -.315). This suggests that treating job security guarantees as exogenous underestimates the 
negative impact of the policy on job insecurity because the policy is correlated with 
individual and workplace features that are unobserved in the data and are associated with 
greater perceptions of job insecurity.  This finding is consistent with the contention that risk 
averse individuals select themselves into more secure workplaces, namely those adopting a 
policy of guaranteed job security.  Although the correlation coefficient is not precisely 
estimated (t=1.17), the impact on the policy adoption coefficient is substantial.  Overall, our 
results indicate that policy adoption is beneficial to perceived job security, and that both 
workplace and individual unobserved heterogeneity would understate the effect if not taken 
into account. 
 
Table 3: 
The Impact of Job Security Guarantees on Job Insecurity 
 Job Insecurity 
 Exogenous Endogenous 
   
Job security guarantee -.129 -.315 
 (2.76) (1.81)    
Personal characteristics Yes 
   
Job characteristics  Yes 
   
Workplace characteristics  Yes 
   
Correlation of unobservables 
between insecurity and job 
guarantee equation (ρ) 
 .105 
(1.17) 
   
Exclusion of instruments from 
insecurity equation, p-value  
 0.763 
Exclusion of instruments from 
guarantee equation, p-value 
 0.030 
   
Log-likelihood -25213.02 -32160.99 
Model p-value  0.0000 0.0000 
 
 13
If employers expect something in return for their job security guarantees, we might 
expect this to show up in the effect of job security guarantees on employees’ perceptions of 
other aspects of their jobs.  To investigate this possibility we ran identical analyses to those 
described above for job insecurity, but this time on seven different measures of the way 
employees viewed their jobs.  Three of these measures relate to satisfaction with non-
pecuniary aspects of the job (sense of achievement, respect from supervisors and influence 
over the job); a fourth relates to satisfaction with pay; the other three relate to perceptions of 
how hard employees feel they have to work, the time they have to get their job done, and 
worrying about work outside working hours. Details are contained in Appendix Table 2.  In 
all cases job security guarantees are not significantly associated with negative perceptions of 
jobs along these seven dimensions.  These results hold when treating job security guarantees 
as endogenous.13  The only time in which the correlation between the unobservables in the 
outcome and job security guarantee equations (ρ) approaches statistical significance is in the 
pay satisfaction equation (t=1.43), producing a positive albeit non-significant (t=1.28) impact 
of the guarantee on pay dissatisfaction having accounted for the negative unobservable 
correlation between the guarantee and job dissatisfaction. Thus, it seems that job security 
guarantees reduce job insecurity and that this is not at the expense of other facets of the job. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Using linked employer-employee data for Britain, we show that, although job security 
guarantees are associated with an increased probability of workforce reductions, they ‘work’ 
in two key respects.  First, conditional on workforce reductions, compulsory redundancies are 
less likely where there is a guarantee of job security.  Secondly, controlling for a range of 
individual, job and workplace characteristics, we find job security guarantees are associated 
with lower perceptions of job insecurity.  This appears to be a causal effect since the effect is 
robust to the treatment of the guarantee as endogenous.  Indeed, treating the guarantee as 
exogenous underestimates its effect in reducing insecurity,  a finding that is consistent with 
the contention that job security guarantee policies are often introduced at times when the 
workplace is undergoing organisational change or workforce reductions, both of which are 
                                                 
13 Our high labour costs instrument is not significant in any of these outcome equations, and remains significant 
throughout in estimating job security guarantees.  This lends further weight to our argument that it is a 
reasonable instrument for estimating the effect of security guarantees on employees’ job perceptions. 
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likely to create feelings of job insecurity.  It does not seem that employers expect ‘something 
in return’ for the guarantee, since job security guarantees have no effect on a range of other 
employee perceptions of their working environment. 
It is not possible to judge from this analysis whether the adoption of job security 
guarantees would have similar effects for new adopters of the policy.  Nor can we identify the 
conditions under which guarantees can have the most beneficial effects.  These might be 
fruitful avenues for future research. 
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Appendix Table 1: Mean scores for variables used in analysis 
 
Job security guarantee: .143 
 
Demographics 
Female   .480 
Age: 
   <20    .056 
   20-24   .076 
   25-29   .126 
   30-39   .288 
   40-49   .247 
   50-59   .173 
   60+    .034 
Academic qualifications: 
   ‘A’ level or above  .371 
   Below ‘A’ level   
   None   .235 
Poor health   .060 
Non-white   .034 
Children   .541 
Married   .699 
Union member  .391 
 
Job characteristics 
Occupation: 
   Managerial   .097 
   Professional and skilled .302 
   Other occupations  .601 
Job done equally 
 by men and women  .297 
Family friendly index  .975 
Day off in emergency  .972 
Paid overtime   .459 
10+ days training last year .088 
Permanent contract  .935 
Gross weekly pay: 
   <£50    .070 
   £51-£80   .069 
   £81-£140   .120 
   £141-£180   .088 
   £181-£220   .113 
   £221-£260   .106 
   £261-£310   .099 
   £311-£360   .082 
   £361-£430   .101 
   £431-£540   .078 
   £541-£680   .040 
 16
   £681+   .034 
Weekly hours   36.05 
Tenure: 
   <1 year   .161 
   1, <2 years   .124 
   2, <5 years   .233 
   5, <10 years   .221 
   10+ years   .261 
Workplace characteristics 
Industry: 
   Manufacturing  .239 
   Elec, gas and water  .007 
   Construction  .031 
   Wholesale and retail .155 
   Hotels and restaurants .042 
   Transport, communication .057    
   Financial services  .040 
   Other business services .082 
   Public administration .089 
   Education   .101 
   Health   .124 
   Other community services .033 
Region: 
   London   .095 
   Scotland and Wales  .140 
   South of England  .317 
   Midlands   .195 
   North   .253 
200+ employees 
 at workplace   .437 
Single workplace  .247 
Public sector   .299 
Head office, admin office 
 or single establishment .323 
Workplace 21+ years old .508 
Female employment share .483 
% part-timers   .256 
% management  .083 
% professional, technical and 
 craft    .316 
% other occupations  .601 
Unemployment of 5%+ 
 in TTWA   .506 
Union density   35.16 
High wage share  .507 
 
Note:  family friendly index runs from zero to three, with a point scored everytime the 
following are available to the worker: job sharing, parental leave, flexitime. 
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Appendix Table 2: The impact of job security guarantees on other employee job attitudes 
 Work hard  Job done  Worry a lot  Pay dissat.  Achieve dissat.  Respect dissat.  Influence dissat. 
 Exog Endog  Exog Endog  Exog Endog  Exog Endog  Exog Endog  Exog Endog  Exog Endog 
Guarantee 0.036 -0.214  0.076 0.076  0.046 0.055  -0.003 0.298  -0.061 -0.240  -0.026 -0.165  -0.031 -0.132 
 (0.66) (0.73)  (1.46) (0.20)  (1.30) (0.24)  (0.07) (1.28)  (1.30) (0.76)  (0.75) (0.42)  (0.65) (0.37) 
ρ  0.142 
(0.96) 
  0.000 
(0.00) 
  -0.005 
(0.04) 
  -0.170 
(1.43) 
  0.101 
(0.64) 
  0.078 
(0.37) 
  0.057 
(0.31) 
Log likelihood -21086 -27998  -25884 -32840  -26856 -33820  -25866 -32817  -24549 -31492  -26321 -33280  -24221 -31162 
Model p-value  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
Notes.  
1) The table shows job security guarantee coefficients when regressed on seven employee job attitudes using ordered probit models.  In 
each case the left-hand column treats the guarantee as exogenous while the right-hand column treats it as endogenous, using the same 
identification procedure as that described for job insecurity. In all cases the proportion of revenue/costs is positive and significant in the 
job security guarantee equation and is not statistically significant for the outcome variable. 
2) The dependent variables are as follows:  
a. Work hard: agree/disagree scale response to ‘My job requires that I work very hard’ (with ‘disagree’ and ‘disagree strongly’ 
collapsed due to small numbers in those categories);   
b. Job done: agree/disagree scale response to ‘I never seem to have enough time to get my job done’; 
c. Worry a lot: agree/disagree scale response to ‘I worry a lot about my work outside working hours’; 
d. Pay dissat.:  satisfaction scale response to ‘The amount of pay you receive’ 
e. Achieve dissat.: satisfaction scale response to ‘The sense of achievement you get from your work’; 
f. Respect dissat.: satisfaction scale response to ‘The respect you get from supervisors/line managers’; 
g. Influence dissat.: satisfaction scale response to ‘The amount of influence you have over your job’.  
3) Regressions use an identical set of controls to those used for the job insecurity models presented in Table 3.  Regressions are run with 
survey stratification weights and account for the presence of repeated observations on the same establishment.  
4) ρ is the correlation of unobservables between the outcome and job guarantee equation.  
5) Asymptotically robust t-ratios in parentheses. 
6) All regressions are run on the 19,050 observations with no missing data. 
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